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In this paper I present a calibrated model of life-cycle occupation and investment 
decisions where households choose between paid work and entrepreneurship and 
conditional on the latter how much of their savings to invest in their business. The 
returns to entrepreneurial activity are modeled through Bayesian learning. The model is 
able to reproduce the main stylized facts of entry in and exit out of self-employment over 
the life-cycle. It also suggests a partial explanation of the recent finding of Moskowitz 
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) that entrepreneurs seem not to require a premium for the 
extra risk of their private equity investment. 
 
Keywords: Occupational choice, portfolio choice, entrepreneurship, firm 
dynamics, learning, private equity premium. 
 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Understanding entrepreneurial investment is of fundamental importance, given
t h er o l et h a tp r i v a t e l yh e l dﬁrms play in overall economic activity. This can
be summarized by a few facts: according to Evans and Leighton (1989) a little
more than one tenth of Americans operate a business on a full time basis and
they give employment to about a tenth of all wage workers. The economic
importance of entrepreneurial households is even greater though, since these
households appear more than proportionately in the higher percentiles of the
income and net worth distribution holding 40 percent of total national wealth.
Since they hold undiversiﬁed portfolios where equity in their own business makes
a large part of their asset holdings, this translates into a size of the private equity
market that is of the same order of magnitude of the public equity market.
Surprisingly enough not much eﬀort has been made to model and study
quantitatively the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and the eco-
nomic decisions of those who carry it out, that is, actual and potential entrepre-
neurs. The purpose of this paper is to make a ﬁrst eﬀort at ﬁlling this gap by
bringing together diﬀerent strands of literature to understand the main features
of entrepreneurial investment.
To address this issue I develop a life-cycle partial equilibrium model where
agents work, retire and then die. During working life agents make an occupa-
tional choice: at each point in time they decide between working for pay and
becoming entrepreneurs. This choice is always reversible so that it is repeated
in every period until retirement. Workers supply their labor in exchange for
a wage and choose how much to consume and how much to save in a risky ﬁ-
nancial asset. Entrepreneurs receive earnings from their business, choose their
optimal consumption and saving plan and decide how to allocate their wealth
between equity in their business and the ﬁnancial asset. Three key features
characterize the way entrepreneurial activity is modeled. First I assume that
the average return to a private ﬁrm is ﬁxed in the course of its life and not
known at the time the entry decision is made. Agents make the decision to en-
ter self-employment based on a noisy signal of this average return. After that,
they learn about it over time by applying Bayes rule to the realized stochastic
returns, possibly reverting to paid employment if they ﬁnd out that the returns
to the ﬁrm are on average low. Second, exogenous imperfections in ﬁnancial
markets force the entrepreneur to ﬁnance the private business out of his own
wealth and a minimum equity requirement is assumed. Finally the process for
entrepreneurial earnings is taken to be highly correlated with the process for
t h er e t u r nt oe q u i t yi n v e s t e di nt h ep r i v a t eﬁrm; this is meant to capture the
fact that most entrepreneurs work in the same business where they invest their
3wealth.
The model is calibrated and its quantitative properties are examined. The
goal is to check if the joint operation of life-cycle occupation, consumption and
investment decisions and the learning mechanism can explain the main features
of entrepreneurial investment and more speciﬁcally to assess the marginal con-
tribution of the latter. The results are promising along two dimensions. The
ﬁrst concerns the dynamics of the occupational choice implied by entrepreneur-
ship: the model with imperfect information about project quality and learning
generates quantitatively reasonable patterns of entry in and exit out of self-
employment over time and along the household life-cycle whereas a similarly
calibrated model without those features shows counterfactual predictions. The
second one concerns the portfolio dimension of entrepreneurial activity. Cou-
pled with the empirically plausible assumption that entrepreneurial income is on
average greater than that of paid workers, the model with learning also suggests
a partial explanation to the surprising fact recently discovered by Moskowtiz
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) of the absence of a private equity premium. Since
the model is partial equilibrium it does not directly address this asset pricing
fact. What it does is to provide an explanation for why despite the lack of an
observed private equity premium and the higher risk of this investment many
agents choose to become entrepreneurs and put large shares of their wealth in
their ﬁrm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next subsection of the
introduction I provide a brief description of the relation between the current
paper and the diﬀerent lines of research that it attempts to bring together.
Then in Section 2 the model is described, in Section 3 I present the calibration,
in Section 4 the results and ﬁnally in Section 5 the conclusions.
1.1 Contribution with Respect to the Literature
The present research relates to a number of papers, both empirical and the-
oretical from diﬀerent areas. First of all the life-cycle precautionary savings
models like Carroll (1997) or Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994) and succes-
sive extensions that add a portfolio choice to the basic model like for example
Campbell et al. (1999) or Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005). With these pa-
pers the present model shares its basic structure, that is, the fact of analyzing,
in a partial equilibrium setting, the optimal life-cycle choices of an agent that
faces uninsurable idiosyncratic earnings risk and borrowing constraints and goes
through the stages of working life and retirement. It departs from them in that
it adds to the basic consumption and saving decision the choice between a menu
of two diﬀerent earnings processes that are interpreted as diﬀerent occupations,
4that is, self-employment and paid work. It also allows the subset of households
who choose the former to have access to a wider set of assets that include private
equity and studies the portfolio choice in this case.
Second it relates to the literature on the choice to become entrepreneurs.
This literature is essentially empirical and provides background motivation for
the present research. Among these works the most direct reference is a paper by
Evans and Leighton (1989) that estimates a model of self-employment entry and
exit using NLS and CPS data. Other related papers are the ones that investigate
the role of household wealth in the decision to become entrepreneurs: Evans and
Jovanovic (1989), using the NLS ﬁnd that wealth matters and suggest the exis-
tence of binding liquidity constraints, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) using the PSID
ﬁnd the opposite, that is, except for very wealthy individuals, the transition
to entrepreneurship seems unaﬀected by initial wealth, suggesting that liquid-
ity constraints are not an important impediment to starting a business for the
large majority of US households. Still in the empirical approach is the work by
Hamilton (2000) who estimates self versus paid employment earnings. He uses
the SIPP and constructs a number of diﬀerent measures for self-employment
earnings; when the most comprehensive one is used he ﬁnds that median earn-
ings are higher for workers while mean earnings are higher for entrepreneurs. He
also ﬁnds that mean tenure proﬁles are steeper for entrepreneurs whose earnings
start below but then overtake those of paid-workers.
A third line of research that bears important common points with the present
paper is the one about industry dynamics of which two notable examples are
Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992). Those papers study, in a theoreti-
cal framework, the long-run equilibrium of an industry as it results from the
entry and exit decisions of ﬁrms. In those papers ﬁrms’ decisions are studied
abstracting from the choices of their owners and the decision to enter or exit
the industry is based on the value of being in the industry compared to an
exogenous outside option. The main diﬀerence from the current paper is then
that here ﬁrm dynamics is dictated by the occupational, saving and portfolio
decisions of the owner and the value of the option to quit is the endogenously
determined value of switching from self to paid employment. Particularly strong
is the relationship with the cited work of Jovanovic, since I borrow from that
work one key assumption governing occupational choice, that is, that returns to
entrepreneurship are learned by Bayes’ rule while running the business.
Finally the present research relates to the cited work by Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jørgensen and the few papers that have tried to rationalize the surpris-
ing fact they discovered. Brieﬂy stated the two authors report that entrepre-
neurial risk is quite substantial because returns are very volatile and because
entrepreneurs invest large shares of their ﬁnancial wealth, as well as their human
5capital in their ﬁrm. Given this, one would expect risk averse entrepreneurs to
demand a large premium for ﬁrm speciﬁcr i s k . T h et w oa u t h o r st h o u g hﬁnd
that private equity in aggregate provides about the same return as the much
less risky public equity. Among the papers that have proposed explanations to
this ﬁnding is the one by Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina (2005) who propose a
theory based on borrowing constraints, the existence of an outside opportunity
and endogenous risk choice. The possibility of exit creates a non concavity in
the agent’s continuation value. Risky projects provide lotteries that eliminate
this non concavity and are particularly valuable to low wealth agents that will
then undertake them at no premium over the safe project. Others are the paper
by Hintermeier and Steinberger (2005) who construct a life-cycle portfolio choice
model where entrepreneurship is interpreted as investing in a third asset, private
equity, on top of risk-free bonds and risky stock and Polkovnichenko (2003) who
presents a static model to asses the excess return that private equity must pay
over public equity when only a small portion of the agent’s human capital is ac-
tually invested in the business. The present work shares the dynamic life-cycle
framework with the work of Hintermeier and Steinberger and the two facts that
it both studies a full occupational choice model and addresses issues related
to ﬁrm dynamics with Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina. Its distinctive features
are the assumption of unobserved heterogeneity in ﬁrm returns and learning
on the one hand and the analysis of ﬁrm dynamics in the context of life-cycle
occupational choices on the other.
2 The Model
The life-cycle problem studied in this model is set in a partial equilibrium con-
text, taking as given the processes for asset returns and earnings. The model
is populated by ﬁnitely lived agents. Time is discrete and the model period is
assumed to be one year. Agents live for a maximum of T =8 0years and during
the course of their life face an age changing probability of surviving. If they
are still alive they work until model age 45 and retire afterwards. Model age is
equal to real-life age minus twenty. In what follows agents’ age is denoted with
t while a will denote the age of the business the agent may run.1
Utility is deﬁned over the stream of consumption enjoyed during lifetime and
there are no bequests. Period utility is discounted at the rate β. Let pt+1 be
the probability that an agent survives until age t+1conditional on being alive
at age t. Agents maximize
1Since I will simulate a cohort of agents all born at the same time, t will be used for time













where ct is period consumption, E0 is the expectation operator at the beginning
of working life and p0 =1 .
During working life agents are endowed with a certain amount of human
capital that they supply inelastically. This endowment evolves deterministically
over time but is equal for all agents of a given age. In other words the endowment
of human capital ωt follows the same path over the lifetime of all agents.
During working life agents have to make an occupational choice: they have
to decide between working for pay and becoming entrepreneurs. The decision
is made every period and is always reversible.
Workers sell their human capital endowment to the market, get a wage and
choose optimally how to split their resources between consumption and savings
which occur through the single ﬁnancial asset available in the economy. I call
this asset stock. I denote the amount of public stocks held at time t by St and
impose a short sale constraint St ≥ 0. This asset pays a stochastic gross return
Rt which I assume to be i.i.d. over time. The process for the stock return is
uncorrelated with all other stochastic processes in the economy. The wage rate
is normalized to 1. Workers’ earnings are given by ωtεt where εt is a stochastic





and i.i.d. over time. The shock is
also independent across agents and uncorrelated with the return to the ﬁnancial
asset. Finally workers get the chance to observe a signal on the quality of a
project that they can potentially run if they decide to be self-employed in the
next period. I will give more details about the speciﬁc description of project
quality in what follows when talking about the entrepreneurial problem.
Entrepreneurs have to use their human capital to run their business. They
can invest their wealth in the same ﬁnancial asset as workers, but have also ac-
cess to a second asset, that is, the equity in their own business. Private equity
investment Kt is subject to a minimum requirement K > 0. As it will become
clear later, given that the entrepreneurial technology is assumed to be linearly
additive in the agent’s endowment of labor and ﬁnancial investment, this posi-
tivity constraint is needed to have private equity investment also among newly
entered entrepreneurs. This ﬁts with the empirical evidence that most private
equity is held by individuals who are at the same time the managers of the
business. At the theoretical level extensive literature starting with Jensen and
Meckling (1976) demonstrates how asymmetric information about managerial
actions impose the entrepreneurs to commit personal funds to ﬁnance their
project justifying the assumption made here. The critical element in the model
7is the way returns to private equity are deﬁned. There are two components that
determine the return to equity invested in a private business. A ﬁrst component
is ﬁrm speciﬁca n dﬁxes the average project return over its entire life. With a
slight abuse of notation I denote this component x.I nf a c ti nt h ec o u r s eo ft h e i r
life agents may enter and exit self-employment more than once and so have dif-
ferent x at diﬀerent times; however I use x instead of xt to stress the fact that
the average project return is ﬁxed for a given project. It is assumed that there is






While agents are workers they get a draw from X. If they decide to start a
business they keep the same value of x while they operate it, if they decide to
continue as paid employees they get a new draw from X in the coming period.
Successive draws from X are independent over time2. The second component,






is i.i.d. over time and across ﬁrms. In practice an entrepreneur receives a se-





. Agents know the exact
distribution of X and U but they can’t observe their own realization x. What
they observe is a signal that is a known function of the two components:
ρt = λ +e x p( x + ut). (2)
Also ρt is the actual return to wealth invested in a business with average return





. Since entrepreneurs can in fact see the sum (x + ut) and
know the distribution of the two components they can update their beliefs about
the average return of their project by using the initial prior distribution of x with
mean b xτ =0 , corresponding to the true population average with the sequence
of observations yt = x + ut, t = τ +1 ,......,τ + A where τ +1indexes the
age when the business was started and A is the number of signals received.
Denoting by b xt+1 the expectation of the posterior distribution of the average
return parameter, it can be easily shown that it follows the law of motion:
b xt+1 =( 1− Λa+1)b xt + Λa+1yt+1 (3)
where 1 − Λa+1 and Λa+1 are the weights assigned to the prior average and
new observation respectively, and are determined according to the Bayesian
2This assumption implies that the experience acquired by running a ﬁrm is entirely lost
when the business is closed. One consequence is that the model cannot capture the fact that
the probability of entry is higher for former business owners than for the general population
as reported in Quadrini (2000). One alternative assumption would be that the draw on the
project quality is taken from a better distribution if an agent had previously run a business
in her life. This would help matching the fact reported by Quadrini and would increase the
value of starting a business possibly leading to an even lower private equity premium. Adding
this assumption would further complicate the solution of the model and is not pursued further
here.
8updating rule. 3 These weights are a deterministic function of the variance of
the distribution of X and U and of the number of signals received, that is, the
age of the business. The iteration starts with b xt =0 , the mean of the initial
prior distribution which coincides with the distribution of x in the population.
Finally λ is a constant that shifts up and down the expected project return
without aﬀecting other moments of its distribution.
Entrepreneurs also receive income from their endowment of human capital
ωt. Entrepreneurial earnings are given by ωtξt where ξt follows an i.i.d. process





. The process for ξ is highly correlated with ρ and hence
with the noise u, but the correlation is not perfect. The assumption that the
correlation between u and ξ is positive but not perfect is meant to capture the
fact that according to the SCF, a member of the household is often the manager
of the business at the same time that other members work outside the business.
This presumably leads to high correlation between households earnings and
return to private equity. A second property of ξ is that its mean µξ is increasing
with the average return to private equity so that business owners who run a good
ﬁrm earn both a higher return on the ﬁnancial capital they optimally choose
to invest in and higher income from the ﬁxed human capital they are endowed
with.
All agents retire at the same age and those who are entrepreneurs at that
age get back the equity in their business and convert it into stocks at no cost.
All retired agents receive a ﬁxed pension beneﬁt and simply choose optimal
consumption and savings. Post-retirement utility is subsumed in the function
V (dRet) which results from the optimal consumption/saving plan solved by an
agent in the ﬁrst year of retirement, given that he starts with current resources
equal to dRet. Workers, entrepreneurs and retired agents all have access to the
same risky ﬁnancial asset.
Given the description above I can write the recursive formulation of the
household utility maximization problem during working age. At each age t
before retirement the household compares the utility of becoming a worker with
that of choosing entrepreneurship. The optimal utility of choosing to become
a worker in the next period for an agent whose state is described by the triple




t (dt,b xt,a)= m a x
ct,St+1
u(ct)+βpt+1EtVt+1 (dt+1, b xt+1,1) (4)
3See Sargent and Ljunqvist (2000) for a derivation of this formula as well as the exact
deﬁnition of Λ.
9ct + St+1 ≤ dt (5)
dt+1 = Rt+1St+1 + εt+1ωt+1 (6)
b xt+1 =( 1− Λ1)b xt + Λ1yt+1 (7)
b xt =0 (8)
St+1 ≥ 0,c t ≥ 0. (9)
Notice that since agents receive a ﬁrst signal about a new project while they are
working for pay, the variable a is set to 1 in the right hand side of the Bellman
equation; for the same reason in the law of motion for b xt+1 I have the index on
the weight Λ taking the value one.
The utility of becoming an entrepreneur is instead deﬁned as:
V se
t (dt, b xt,a)= m a x
ct,St+1,Kt+1
u(ct)+βpt+1EtVt+1 (dt+1,b xt+1,a+1 )(10)
ct + St+1 + Kt+1 ≤ dt (11)
dt+1 = Rt+1St+1 + ρt+1Kt+1 + ξt+1ωt+1 (12)
b xt+1 =( 1− Λa+1)b xt + Λa+1yt+1 (13)
b xt+1 = xi fa+1≥ L (14)
Kt+1 ≥ K > 0,S t+1 ≥ 0,c t ≥ 0. (15)
A few comments are needed about the evolution over time of the estimated
average returns. First notice that the state variables referring to the returns
to equity in the business are b x and a. While the true average return on equity
invested in the business is ﬁxed by x, agents do not observe it and use the
estimated value b x instead. As the law of motion of b xt follows a ﬁrst order
process, b xt must appear as a state variable in the agent’s decision problem.
Also, the number of years a ﬁrm has been operated, a, is a state variable since
10agents need to know the distribution of estimated private equity returns next
period in order to compute EtVt+1. That distribution is normal with a variance
that evolves according to a deterministic law and is a function of the number
of noisy observations on the parameter, that, is the age of the business. After
a ﬁnite number of periods, denoted with L, the true value of x is revealed
to agents, so that b xt = x for a ≥ L. I make this assumption for numerical
reasons4. However, learning takes place very fast so that after a few periods the
estimate that agents make about their average return is very precise and changes
only marginally as new signals accrue. Since these changes drive the exit of
ﬁrms, truncating learning after some periods does not aﬀect ﬁrm dynamics. For
expositional reasons in what follows I will label businesses whose type is already
known “mature” and businesses whose type is still being learned “young”.
Finally, the value function at time t is obtained as the result of the optimal
occupational choice, that is:
Vt (dt,b xt,a)=m a x{V
pe
t (dt,b xt,a),Vse
t (dt, b xt,a)}. (16)
The model is analytically intractable and therefore it is solved numerically.
The decision rules obtained from the agent’s dynamic programming problem are
then used together with simulated series of shocks to produce individual histories
of actual decisions and statistics are computed on the resulting aggregates.
3C a l i b r a t i o n
In this section I describe the choice of parameters in the model. The model
period is assumed to be one year. Period utility is assumed to be of the standard







The risk aversion parameter α is set to 2 and the subjective discount rate β is
set at 0.96 values consistent with most macro studies like for example Aiyagari
(1994). The maximum length of life is deterministic but there is a probability of
dying at each age 1− pt+1 which I calibrate using mortality tables for the U.S.
male population taken from “The Berkeley Mortality Database” (available at
http://www.demog.berkeley.edu). Each agent’s endowment of human capital
ωt evolves deterministically over time and is measured using the age proﬁle
estimated by Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) for high school graduates.
4An agent at the end of working life may have been in business for up to 45 years. Therefore
by not truncating learning I would need 45 state space points along the ﬁrm age dimension
slowing down the program considerably.
11The risky ﬁnancial asset in the economy, which I interpret as the index of public
equity, has an average gross return of 1.08 and takes with equal probability the
values [0.92, 1.24] corresponding to a standard deviation of 16 percent in line
with the historical standard deviation of the S&P 500 index.
While working as a paid employee, the human capital endowment ωt is hit





.I s e t µε =0and
σ2
ε =0 .025. This latter value is taken from Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994)
where it is the estimate of the standard deviation of the i.i.d. innovation to the
AR(1) process they use to model wage earnings5.
Next I describe how I choose the parameters related to the private equity
return function:
ρ = λ +e x p( x + u). (18)











. In order to choose
the two variances I ﬁrst ﬁxt h er a t i oσ2
x/σ2
u and then set the level of one of the
two. The ratio is crucial in determining the statistical properties of the law of
motion of the estimated average project return parameter b xt+1 which in turn
are the key elements in ﬁxing the exit rate of ﬁrms. Intuitively a lower ratio,
is associated with noisier observations on the average project quality, hence
learning takes place more slowly and exit rates are larger for a longer period.
The criterion I follow to ﬁx the ratio is then to match the ten year survival rate




Given the ratio σ2
x/σ2
u,It h e nﬁx the level of the variances. Lacking an
estimate of project risk based on actual data I consider three diﬀerent levels
of project risk. I pick the variance of the shock so that the model generates
endogenously some given values of the standard deviations of the returns: 0.28,
0.35 and 0.5. These three values are very close to the ones used in Heaton and
Lucas (2002), the highest value is close to the average volatility of individual
stocks in the CRSP sample (see Campbell et al. 2001).
The other component of the pay-oﬀ to becoming entrepreneurs is the stream
of earnings the agents receives when his human capital is used in his business
5The reason for this choice is that in this way the standard deviation of wage earnings one
period ahead conditional on the current value is the same for the two models. Assuming AR(1)
shocks would enrich the predictions of the model along the occupational choice dynamics. For
example is this case agents would tend to enter entrepreneurship when they receive lower
labor earnings shocks since this would predict a lower value of continuing as paid employees,
something that is found in the data (see Evans and Leighton, 1989). On the contrary the
ﬁndings of the model about the excess return of private equity would be basically unchanged
since the return on the private equity index depends mainly on the risk of the ﬁnancial
investment faced by those who choose to become entrepreneurs.
12instead of being rented out to the market. Here the calibration strategy is based
on two goals. First it targets the ratio of average self-employment earnings to
average worker earnings in the population: this is taken to be 1.2 following
the value reported in Hamilton (2000). 6 Second it assumes a high correlation
between this ﬂow of earnings and the return to the investment the entrepreneurs
makes in his business. This concerns both the average of the two and the
idiosyncratic shocks that determine their yearly realizations. Unfortunately
there is no empirical reference to ﬁx the correlation coeﬃc i e n ts oIs e ti tt o
0.75. The choice of a high number is meant capture the fact that most private
businesses are run by a member of the household that owns them so that a
“good business", or “good luck" in any given year of its life, are reﬂected on
both earnings and capital returns. Because of the arbitrary choice of this number
some sensitivity analysis is performed.
Another crucial variable in determining both entry and the model generated
return on the index of private equity is the minimum capital requirement. In
order to calibrate this parameter I try to make it comparable in size with the
wage an agent would get as a worker. To do so I take data form Hurst and
Lusardi (2002) about the amount of equity needed to start a business and com-
pare it with the wage of beginning high school workers taken from the life-time
proﬁles of earnings reported in Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994). As a result
of this comparison I set the minimum equity requirement equal to one year of
20 year old worker wages.
F i n a l l yId e s c r i b eh o wIs e tt h ec o n s t a n tλ. Notice that once all the other
parameters have been ﬁxed λ controls the average return on private equity
simply by shifting it up and down. Rather than setting λ and looking at the
resulting allocation as is typical in the quantitative literature about portfolio
choice, I work the other way round by gauging a given average entrepreneurial
portfolio composition and backing out the average private equity return that
supports it. In practice I set the constant λ to a level such that entrepreneurs
will hold on average 32 percent of their portfolio in business equity, a number
taken from Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002).7
6Hamilton reports three diﬀerent measures of entrepreneurial earnings. The one I use here
is what he calls the EAD which includes what the entrepreneurs draws from the business plus
the change in the equity invested net of the opportunity cost of that investment.
The ﬁnding that entrepreneurial earnings are higher than those of wage earners is common
in the literature. Such result is obtained for example in Rosen and Willen (2002) as well.
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) themselves ﬁnd that conditional on a number of
characteristics, like age and education the self-reported wages of entrepreneurs are higher
than those of workers in the SCF.
7This number is obtained by multiplying the average share of private equity for those who
have positive amounts of it by the percentage of that private equity invested in one single
business. The two ﬁgures are 41 and 82 percent respectively. This choice is motivated by the
fact that in my model agents can only run one business at a time.
134R e s u l t s
I nt h ep r e s e n ts e c t i o nIr e p o r tt h er e s u l t so ft h eq u a n t i t a t i v ee x p e r i m e n t s .T h e
presentation is organized in two subsections. In the ﬁrst one a benchmark case
is considered: a number of entrepreneurial investment features are examined in
the models with and without learning and a discussion of the mechanism driving
the results is conducted. In the second section I report results from a sensitivity
analysis.
4.1 The Benchmark Case
I consider the benchmark case to be the one with intermediate project risk. This
is obtained by setting σ2
u =0 .048, which generates an observed standard devia-
tion of returns of 0.354 a value that is very close to the intermediate project risk
considered in Heaton and Lucas (2002). The results are organized in two subsec-
tions, the ﬁrst one about the dynamics of entry and exit from entrepreneurship
and the second about entrepreneurial investment. They are reported both for
the model with learning and the one without it. The latter case is obtained
from the former by assuming that agents draw a value of x and not x + u so
that they make their entry decision based on the knowledge of the true project
return. During the life of the project they then receive the usual sequence of
i.i.d. draws from u. Also the constant λ that controls average return is adjusted
so that the mean share investment in private equity is kept constant at its 32
percent target.
4.1.1 Entrepreneurial Dynamics
Results are reported in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2. Table 1 reports data on
ﬁrm entry and exit. In the model with learning the entry rate is 2.4 percent and
the survival rate at a 10 year horizon is 23.6 percent. These two ﬁgures match
exactly their calibration target, taken respectively from Evans and Leighton
(1989) and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002). In order to evaluate the
p e r f o r m a n c eo ft h em o d e lw et h e nh a v et ol o o ka to t h e rs t a t i s t i c s .T h es u r v i v a l
rate at a shorter horizon of 5 years in the model is of 30 percent, close to
the empirical value of 38.5 percent. The average fraction of households who
are in self-employment in the model is 14.1 percent which is close to the 11
percent ﬁgure in the SCF according to Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen. Also
the average age of ﬁrms is 7 years in the model and 10.3 in the SCF and the
cumulative exit rate, that is 14.3 percent in the model, is according to Evans
and Leighton (1989) equal to 21.6 percent using the CPS. Overall the statistics
reported above show that the model does a very good job at reproducing the
14Table 1: Entrepreneurial Dynamics, Intermediate Risk
Data Learning No learning
Average entry rate 2.4 % 2.4 % 3.0 %
Survival rate (10 years) 23.6 23.6 87.9
Survival rate (5 years) 38.5 29.8 94.6
Cumulative exit rate 21.6 14.3 4.4
Fraction of entrepreneurs 11.0 14.1 38.3
Average ﬁrm age 10.3 7.0 22.2
main features of entry in and exit out of entrepreneurial activity. Learning with
i.i.d. signals seems to take place slightly faster than what the data suggest: this
shows up in that the survival rate at 5 year horizon is somewhat lower than its
empirical counterpart. Another factor that helps explaining the small deviations
of the model from the data are the two assumptions that there are no bequests
and that retirement age is the same for workers and entrepreneurs, while in the
data entrepreneurs tend to retire a few years later. Both eﬀectively shorten the
life of successful businesses reducing the average ﬁrm age in the model compared
to the one in the data. If we look at the third column of Table 1 we see that the
model without learning gives rise to very counterfactual results except for the
average entry rate which is at 3 percent, a number that is only slightly above its
data counterpart. The survival rates at 10 and 5 year horizons are 87.9 percent
and 94.6 percent respectively and the corresponding cumulative exit rate is a
puny 4.4 percent. Given the entry rate, such a low exit rate implies that the
average share of entrepreneurs in the economy is 38.3 percent, more than three
times the empirical value and the average ﬁrm age is 22.2 years, double the one
in the data. The interpretation of these results is the following: in the model
with learning the average quality of a project is observed imperfectly with the
consequence that many agents who indeed have good entrepreneurial ideas may
never try to carry them out, while others whose projects are of poor quality will
try anyway. With time and the accrual of further signals about project quality
these latter entrepreneurs will be selected out of the industry. This mechanism
increases exit rates and keeps average ﬁrm age and the share of entrepreneurs
in the population at values that are consistent with the empirical evidence. In
the model with perfect information about project quality all and only those
agents that have good entrepreneurial ideas enter self-employment. Given that
the distribution of project quality in the population is the same in both models
this implies about the same yearly entry rate but with perfect information there
will be no exits except for those determined by retirement and the unlikely
event of a string of very bad realizations of the idiosyncratic shock to returns.

























Figure 1: Figure 1: Entry rate by household age
The consequence is an implausible average length of entrepreneurial spells and
a share of self-employed in the population that is too large.
Results about the way entry and the fraction of self-employed evolves over
the life-cycle are reported in Figures 1 and 2. In Figure 1 I report the en-
try rate into self-employment by age of the household for both the model with
learning and the model without learning. The two lines show a qualitatively
similar pattern: entry is zero initially, then around age 27 it picks up quickly
and reaches a plateau starting at 35. In the model without learning the rate
of entry declines around age 57 but remains positive until retirement, while in
the model with learning it becomes 0 around age 54. The interpretation of the
pattern observed from the beginning to mid working life relies on the role of
the borrowing constraint and the minimum investment scale: agents need to
ﬁnance their business out of their own funds so they need some initial accumu-
lation in order to exploit their entrepreneurial ideas when they occur. Given the
small initial investment required around age 35 virtually all agents have enough
wealth to start a business so that the entry rate stabilizes at the rate of arrival
of potentially viable projects. The decline of entry rates to zero after age 54
16in the model with learning can be explained by observing that, because of the
high failure rates, the expected return early on in self-employment are lower
than in paid employment, so that agents make the initial investment because
this is needed to enjoy the option of the more favorable expected pay-oﬀ later
on if the business proves to be successful. As retirement gets closer the horizon
over which these later favorable returnsc a nb ee n j o y e ds h o r t e n sm a k i n ge n t r y
not attractive. The pattern of entry over the life-cycle is qualitatively similar
t ot h eo n ei nt h ed a t ae x c e p tf o rt h el a t ed e c l i n ei ne n t r yr a t e .A sE v a n sa n d
Leighton (1989) show the entry rate remains constant or even increases close to
retirement. Another diﬀerence is that entry rates in the data, while increasing
over the ﬁrst part of life are never zero. The explanation for the ﬁrst discrepancy
lies in the assumption that retirement is ﬁxed at age 65 for entrepreneurs in the
model while in reality entrepreneurs tend to retire later. 8





































Figure 2: Share of entrepreneurs by household age
Allowing later retirement for the self-employed in the model would increase
the relative value of opening a business not only because of the longer horizon
left to reap the fruits if the business is successful, but also because later in life the
8For example Heaton and Lucas (2000) show that the share in private equity does not
decline to 0 after age 65 according to the SCF, suggesting that many entrepreneurs continue
their activity beyond that age.
17value of the alternative occupation declines as lower pensions substitute wage
earnings. As far as the second discrepancy is concerned the missing element in
the current model are bequest and inter-vivos transfers that would allow some
a g e n t st oh a v ee n o u g hw e a l t ht os t a r tab u s i n e s se v e ni nt h ev e r yﬁrst years
of working life. As far as the percentage of entrepreneurs over the life-cycle is
concerned Figure 2 shows the counter-factually high values in the model without
learning according to which after age 55 about 75 percent of the population
would be self-employed. In the model with learning we see that the percentage
of the population that is self-employed increases early in life and then remains
roughly constant after age 45, a pattern that is consistent with the evidence
in Evans and Leighton (1989). Quantitatively the plateau is a little above 20
percent while it is around 13 percent in the data. This excess is in part explained
by the fact that the average share of entrepreneurs is itself higher in the model
than in the data in part because of the above mentioned absence of entry early
in life which concentrates the mass of entrepreneurs towards mid-life.
Overall the results about the evolution of the percentage of self-employed
over the life-cycle conﬁrm the ability of the two key mechanisms proposed here,
that is the liquidity constraint and learning to explain the patterns found in the
data. Moreover the discrepancies found can be attributed to modeling choices
that are not essential to those mechanisms, in particular the omission of inter-
generational transmission of wealth and the assumption that retirement occurs
at a ﬁxed age that is the same for both workers and entrepreneurs.
4.1.2 Entrepreneurial Portfolio and Returns
Next we can look at results concerning entrepreneurial investment. Here the
focus is on the portfolio allocation of the self-employed and the premium that
private equity needs to pay to obtain that allocation. Given its partial equi-
librium formulation, the model cannot directly address the recently emerged
private equity premium puzzle. The question that I try to answer is then simi-
lar to the one in Heaton and Lucas (2002) and Polkovnichenko (2003) who, for
a given excess risk generated by the idiosyncratic nature of private equity, look
at the premium that must be paid to induce agents to make that investment.
Contrary to those papers, here the size of the investment is not ﬁx e db u tc a nb e
adjusted subject to a minimum equity requirement. Consequently the question
itself is slightly altered: I look at the excess return on the index of private eq-
uity that generates the observed average cross-sectional share of private capital
in the portfolio of entrepreneurs. The return on the index of private equity is
deﬁned as the average of individual ﬁrm returns – the ρs – weighted by the
ﬁrms’ share in total private equity. Results are reported in Table 2 for both the
18Table 2: Entrepreneurial Portfolio and Return, Intermediate Risk
Learning No learning
Std. of returns 35.4 % 34.1 %
Private equity index return: all ﬁrms 9.2 10.5
Private equity index return: “mature ﬁrms" 11.4 —
Public equity return 8.0 8.0
Portfolio share of private equity: “mature ﬁrms" 41.0 —
Portfolio share of private equity: “all ﬁrms" 31.0 32.0
model with learning and the one without. In the top line we see the standard
deviation of returns which determines the risk of the entrepreneurial ﬁrm; its
value of about 35 percent corresponds to the intermediate case of Heaton and
Lucas (2002) and is somewhat more than double the historical volatility of the
S&P 500 index. In the last line we see that in both models the average entre-
preneur holds about 32 percent of his wealth in a business as does the average
American entrepreneur: this was a calibration target. In the second line we
can see that the return to private equity that is needed to match that target is
9.2 percent in the model with learning. As can be read in the fourth row the
exogenous return on the risky ﬁnancial asset is 8 percent, corresponding to a
1.2 percent premium. If we look at the model with perfect information about
project quality we see that the private equity return is in this case 10.5 percent
implying a 2.5 percent premium over public equity. The diﬀerence between the
private equity premia measures the contribution of learning and selection to
the explanation of the low observed return to private equity: in practice under
this calibration the premium is cut by 50 percent and left close to a modest 1
percent.
The explanation for this result is the following. In the model with learning at
the time the entry decision is made the entrepreneur faces a very low expected
return on his project because of the high probability that the true underlying
return is low. As time passes and bad ﬁrms are selected out, the expected re-
turn increases. For ﬁrms that have learned their type the premium paid on the
ﬁnancial investment must be high if the entrepreneur is to invest a large fraction
of his wealth in his business. This can be seen in the third row where the return
to the set of mature ﬁrms – those whose type has been revealed – is reported:
this value is 11.4 percent, 3.4 percentage points above the return to the ﬁnan-
cial asset. However the return on the index results from the aggregation of the
return to all individual ﬁrms and these include the many young ﬁrms with low
returns that will be selected out. Notice though that the allocation of wealth to
private equity results from an optimal portfolio choice so that the premium paid
19to mature ﬁrm just compensates them exactly for the idiosyncratic risk of the
project. One question then remains to be answered, that is, why entrepreneurs
are willing to make the initial ﬁnancial investment even though it is more risky
a n dp a y sal o w e re x p e c t e dr e t u r nt h a nt h es t o c k . H e r et h ea n s w e rl i e si nt h e
occupational choice dimension of the decision to invest one’s wealth in a busi-
ness. Choosing self-employment means foregoing wages to substitute them with
an alternative earnings process. Consistent with the evidence I assume that on
average self-employment earnings are greater than wages, consequently success-
ful entrepreneurship gives a substantially higher return on the agents’ human
capital. The return to the initial ﬁnancial investment in the business can then
be thought as the sum of two components, the directly measured return and
the option value of learning: the agent by investing in his ﬁrm buys the option
to enjoy the higher expected earnings of a successful business if it proves to be
s o .W em a yt h e nt h i n ka b o u tt h en e g a t i v ep r e m i u mo nt h ei n i t i a li n v e s t m e n t
as the price of this option.
Table 2 shows two more results about entrepreneurial investment and re-
turns. First if we look at the table the average return to private equity in the
complete set of businesses is 9.2 percent, while the return to mature ﬁrms only
is 11.4 percent. Clearly the return to learning ﬁrms must be even lower than the
average: as it can be seen from Figure 3 returns are monotonically increasing
in the age of the business from a low -9 percent for newly founded ﬁrms to the
11.4 percent for mature ﬁrms mentioned above. Second, looking at the last two
rows of Table 2, it can be seen that the average share of private equity in the
complete set of households is 31 percent while it is 41 percent in the subset
of households owning older ﬁrms whose type has been revealed. The share of
portfolio in private equity of households who are still learning the quality of
their project is then even lower than 31 percent implying that over time the
portfolio share invested in the business increases for continuing entrepreneurs.
This increase is the direct consequence on portfolio allocations of the pattern
of increasing returns over ﬁrm age induced by learning and selection that was
described above. While at present there is no empirical evidence supporting the
existence of a pattern of increasing returns over ﬁrms’ age, there is evidence in
favor of the second result. 9 Gentry and Hubbard (2000), using the 1983 and
1986 waves of the SCF – the only two that have a panel dimension – found
that among continuing entrepreneurs the share of wealth invested in business
9There is a large empirical literature on ﬁrm dynamics that explores the relationship be-
tween age and diﬀerent characteristics of ﬁrms but it focuses on survival and growth rates
rather than returns. Moreover as Evans (1987) points out the sample of ﬁrms examined largely
under-represents the very small ones that are an important element of a model like the one in
this paper that is focused on ﬁrms as the result of an occupational choice. For these reasons
that literature is not of much help in the present context.
20assets increases over time.
























Figure 3: Return by age of ﬁrms
A number of caveats have to be made about the results in this section. First
it was said before that the initial investment carries an unmeasured return in
t h ef o r mo ft h ev a l u eo fh i g he n t r e p r e n e u rial earnings in case of success. This
return is unmeasured only as return to the ﬁnancial investment in the early life
of the ﬁrm; the earnings that create it are instead perfectly measured monetary
earnings. This is important to stress because the existence of unmeasured ben-
eﬁts, like the one of being “your own boss" are often cited as explanations for
the choice to become entrepreneurs. These kinds of beneﬁts are not modeled
in the present research; if they were they could help further reduce the private
equity premium. Second, given the choice of a CRRA utility function and the
value of risk aversion the model premium may seem at ﬁrst sight huge and
might suggest a 100 percent allocation to private equity. The reason why it is
not is that with the current calibration private equity is really very risky: both
the standard deviation of returns and the correlation between self-employment
earnings and returns are very high and as Heaton and Lucas (2000) show in
a traditional model of portfolio allocation between a stock and a bond a rela-
tively modest positive correlation between earnings and stock returns tilts the
21demand towards bonds signiﬁcantly. Whether this calibration is reasonable is
diﬃcult to assess since the evidence, like for example the one about the standard
deviation of returns cited in Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, is indirect and
based on returns to individual publicly traded stocks, probably because of lack
of suﬃciently good data on private ﬁrms. 10 For this reason in the next section
I report the results of a sensitivity analysis on the parameters that control the
amount of risk entailed by private equity investment. Third, the present model
makes a distinction between the earnings of the entrepreneur and the return on
the money invested in the closely held business even though both enter jointly
the occupation decision. This distinction is commonplace; for example in the
SCF a separate question is asked about the wages and proﬁts entrepreneur-
ial households make out of their ﬁrm. Based on this distinction the empirical
work, like the cited works of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) or Hamil-
ton (2000) look at one of the two components in isolation and suggest that some
non-measured beneﬁts of entrepreneurship or some form of overconﬁdence must
exist to justify this occupational choice. This distinction is somewhat arbitrary
and may be misleading since in the end what determines the choice to become
entrepreneurs is the expected value and volatility of the overall income stream
that the business provides, while any of the two components taken separately is
not suﬃciently informative. The important step forward that the present paper
t a k e si sp r e c i s e l yt h a th e r et h ec h o i c et ob e c o m ee n t r e p r e n e u r si sb a s e do nt h e
overall pay-oﬀ that a household that is making the entry decision expects to re-
ceive. In the empirical literature the approach I propose here has been adopted
by Rosen and Willen (2002) who estimate an entrepreneurial income process on
PSID data and ﬁnd that the combination of average and volatility is such that
all but extremely risk averse individuals would choose entrepreneurship. This
result stands in sharp contrast with the one in Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen
although the lack of information about the investment of ﬁnancial resources in
the business limits the conclusiveness of their analysis.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section I report the results that obtain when the variance of the i.i.d.
shocks to entrepreneurial income and returns is changed and summarize brieﬂy
results of other sensitivities. In reporting the results I focus both on self-
employment dynamics and on the returns and portfolio choice of entrepreneurs.
10The available data on private entrepreneurs come from the SCF and the PSID. The SCF
has very good quality asset data and allows to correctly represent the wealthy entrepreneurs
but lacks the panel dimension that would be needed to estimate the actual risk of private
businesses. The PSID has the panel dimension but collects data on assets only every ﬁve
years.
22Table 3: Entrepreneurial Dynamics, Low Risk
Data Learning No learning
Average entry rate 2.4 % 2.4 % 2.9 %
Survival rate (10 years) 23.6 24.0 87.8
Survival rate (5 years) 38.5 29.5 94.7
Cumulative exit rate 21.6 14.1 4.6
Fraction of entrepreneurs 11.0 14.1 38.3
Average ﬁrm age 10.3 6.9 21.8
First I consider a low risk scenario where I set σ2
u =0 .033. Those results are
reported in Table 3 and 4. This corresponds to the low risk project considered in
Heaton and Lucas (2002) as can be seen from the standard deviation of returns
equal to 27.3 percent reported in the ﬁrst line of Table 4. A look at Table 3
shows that the dynamics of self-employment is very similar to the one of the
intermediate risk case. In the model with learning the entry rate is 2.4 percent
and the 10 year survival rate is 24.0 percent: once again these were calibration
target so they correspond to the data counterparts. The survival rate at 5 years
is 29.5 percent close to but a little below the 38.5 percent registered in US
data. The overall exit rate is 14.1 percent and the fraction of entrepreneurs
in the population is 14.1 percent as well. Both ﬁgures are close to the data
that show a cumulative exit rate of 21.6 percent and an average fraction of
entrepreneurs of 11.0 percent. The model then underestimates the ﬁrst ﬁgure
and overestimates the second. When then ol e a r n i n gc a s ei sc o n s i d e r e dw eg e t
once again very counterfactual predictions except for the entry rate that with
a 2.9 percent ﬁgure is only slightly above the US data. Exit is very low at a
rate of 4.6 percent which is also reﬂected in the extremely high survival rates:
94.7 percent at a ﬁve year horizon and 87.8 percent at a 10 year horizon. The
consequences are a share of entrepreneurs of 38.3 percent and an average ﬁrm
age of 21.8 years, both much higher than what is found in the data. Results
concerning entrepreneurial portfolio allocation can be found in Table 4. Here
there are some changes compared to the intermediate risk case. The return
to the private equity index in the model with learning is 7.9 percent while the
exogenous return to the risky ﬁnancial asset is 8 percent implying in this case
that the model can even generate a negative private equity premium. In the
model without learning by contrast the return to the index of private equity
is 9 percent, 1.1 percentage points above the one of the model with learning.
As in the intermediate risk case, in the model with learning, mature ﬁrms face
a higher expected return, which is now 9.7 percent and the owning household
invest a larger share of its portfolio in the business, that is, 40.3 percent.
23Table 4: Entrepreneurial Portfolio and Return, Low Risk
Learning No learning
Std. of returns 27.3 % 26.2 %
Private equity index return: all ﬁrms 7.9 9.0
Private equity index return: “mature ﬁrms" 9.7 —
Public equity return 8.0 8.0
Portfolio share of private equity: “mature ﬁrms" 40.3 —
Portfolio share of private equity: “all ﬁrms" 32.6 32.9
Next we look at the results for the high risk case obtained by setting σ2
u
equal to 0.072. With this value of the variance of the noise, the model with
learning generates a standard deviation of returns of 48 percent in line with
the high project risk considered in Heaton and Lucas (2002). This value is also
close to the volatility of individual stock returns reported in Campbell et al.
(2001). Statistics about entrepreneurial dynamics are reported Table 5. In the
model with learning, given an entry rate of 2.3 percent and a survival rate at
10 years of 23.8 percent, both chosen to match the values in the data, we ﬁnd
that the cumulative exit rate is 14.3 percent and the fraction of entrepreneurs is
13.7 percent, the ﬁrst slightly below the one in the data and the second a little
above. The survival rate at a 5 year horizon is 29.6 percent and the average
ﬁrm age is 7 years. In the model without learning again except for the entry
rate of 2.9 percent all other statistics are very far from the data: at a low
rate of 4.4 percent exit virtually reﬂects retirement of the ﬁrm’s owner and the
survival rates at both chosen horizons exceed 90 percent. As a consequence the
average share of entrepreneurs in the population is 38.8 percent and the average
ﬁrm age is 22.8 years. Table 6 reports the results about the private equity
premium. Given the extremely high risk of investment in a business in this
case the return needed to induce entrepreneurs to hold on average 32 percent
of their wealth in private equity in the model without learning is 13.6 percent,
5.6 percentage points above the return to the diversiﬁed portfolio of stocks. In
the model with imperfect information about project quality, the operation of
low productivity ﬁrms reduces the private equity return by about 2 percentage
points to 11.8 percent, leaving an unexplained premium of 3.8 percent. Looking
in more details at the model with learning we see that mature entrepreneurs
enjoy a 14.6 percent return but even with such a high return their optimal
portfolio choice is to invest only 34 percent of their wealth in private equity.
The fact that continuing entrepreneurs invest larger portfolio shares in their
ﬁrm found by Gentry and Hubbard (2000) is conﬁrmed also in this case even
though the magnitude of the eﬀect of the higher expected return is lower than
24Table 5: Entrepreneurial Dynamics, High Risk
Data Learning No learning
Average entry rate 2.4 % 2.3 % 2.9 %
Survival rate (10 years) 23.6 23.8 90.3
Survival rate (5 years) 38.5 29.6 96.3
Cumulative exit rate 21.6 14.3 4.4
Fraction of entrepreneurs 11.0 13.7 38.8
Average ﬁrm age 10.3 7.0 22.8
with less risky projects.
Other sensitivities with respect to the correlation between the earnings
process of the entrepreneurs and the return to his private equity investment
were performed. Brieﬂy summarized the results were that reducing this corre-
lation does not aﬀect the dynamics of entry in and exit out of self-employment
but reduces the excess return of private equity needed to trigger the targeted
portfolio allocation.
Summarizing the results of this section it can be said that changes in the
risk of the entrepreneurial project – in the range considered here – does not
aﬀect the basic life-cycle patterns of entry into self-employment and the exit
dynamics out of it. The intuition is that the former depend mainly from the
joint operation of the liquidity constraint and the life-cycle accumulation of
wealth that provides the resources to overcome it. The latter depends on the
assumption of Bayesian learning of an i.i.d. process and the calibration of the
ratio between the uncertainty about project quality and the volatility of the
idiosyncratic risk, rather than on the latter only. On the contrary changes in the
risk of the return process aﬀect directly the portfolio choice that entrepreneurs
make and therefore the required premium for a given investment. The intuition
here is straightforward: a higher variance of returns or higher correlation with
the earnings process of the self-employed implies more risk and therefore a higher
premium to induce the same portfolio allocation.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper presents a Jovanovic’s (1982) style industry dynamics model with
learning about the quality of ﬁrms but it makes the value of the outside option
endogenous by merging that framework with a life-cycle occupational choice
model where the alternative to stay in the industry is to work as paid em-
ployee. The model is calibrated and its quantitative properties are examined
showing how the joint operation of life-cycle accumulation, liquidity constraints
25Table 6: Entrepreneurial Portfolio and Return, High Risk
Learning No learning
Std. of returns 48.0 % 47.0 %
Private equity index return: all ﬁrms 11.8 13.6
Private equity index return: “mature ﬁrms" 14.6 —
Public equity return 8.0 8.0
Portfolio share of private equity: “mature ﬁrms" 34.0 —
Portfolio share of private equity: “all ﬁrms" 31.0 32.3
and learning can explain quite well the main features of the life-cycle entry and
exit patterns of entrepreneurs. The model also looks at the decisions of entre-
preneurs about how to allocate their wealth between the private ﬁrm they own
and other assets and addresses the private equity premium puzzle. While its
partial equilibrium nature does not allow it to provide a resolution of this puzzle
the model still provides a useful explanation that is based on heterogeneity of
ﬁrms’ average returns and the higher earnings that the successful ones provide
to their owner: in the model successful ﬁrms indeed provide the high returns
needed to compensate for idiosyncratic risk but the return on the index is low-
ered by the many young ﬁrms with low pay-oﬀs that are doomed to exit. In
turn households are willing to accept this lower pay-oﬀ early on because it is a
price to pay to enjoy the higher return on human capital if the entrepreneurial
idea proves to be good.
The present paper also points to other avenues for research. For example
it would be interesting to look at how the prospect of becoming entrepreneurs
aﬀects savings and what are the relative patterns of wealth accumulation of
entrepreneurs vs. workers: this work was done by Quadrini (2000) and Cagetti
and De Nardi (2002) in an inﬁnite horizon context but it would be useful to
analyze it in the context of a ﬁnite horizon model like the one in this paper.
More importantly in addressing entrepreneurial returns the present paper clearly
points to the need to reassess the issue of the private equity premium puzzle by
explicitly acknowledging its occupational choice dimension. This would require
considering the average and the volatility of the whole stream of income that
a given investment in a closely held business guarantees his owner, rather than
looking separately at the wage and capital return component. This is challenging
empirical work because the data are of much lower quality than those about
public ﬁrms, however it is deﬁnitely needed to reach a better understanding of
entrepreneurial activity. All this work is beyond the scope of the present project
and is left for future research.
26References
[1] Cagetti M. and De Nardi M. (2002). “Entrepreneurship, Frictions and
Wealth”. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Working Paper 620.
[2] Campbell John Y.; Lettau Martin; Malkiel Burton G.; Xu Yexiao. “Have
Individual Stocks Become More Volatile? An Empirical Exploaration of
Idiosyncratic Risk.” Journal of Finance, February 2001, 56(1), pp. 1-44.
[3] Campbell John Y., Cocco Joao, Gomes Francisco and Maenhout Pascal.
1999. “Investing Retirement Wealth ? A Life-cycle Model”. Working paper,
Harvard University.
[4] Cocco Joao; Gomes Francisco and Maenhout Pascal. 2005. “Portfolio
Choice over the Life-Cycle”. Review of Financial Studies, 18(2): 491-533.
[5] Dunne Timothy; Roberts Mark J. and Samuelson Larry. 1988. “Patterns
of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries.” RAND Journal
of Economics, 19(4), 495-515.
[6] Evans David S. 1987. “Test of Alternative Theories of Firm Growth”. Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 95(4): 657-674.
[7] Evans David S. and Leighton Linda S. 1989. “Some Empirical Aspects of
Entrepreneurship”. American Economic Review, 79(3): 519-535.
[8] Gentry, William M. and Hubbard Glenn R. “Entrepreneurship and House-
hold Saving”.National Bureau of Economic Research, (Cambridge, MA)
Working Paper No. 7894, September 2000.
[9] Gomes, Francisco and Michaelides Alexander. 2002. “Life-Cycle Asset Al-
location: A Model with Borrowing Constraints, Uninsurable Labor Income
Risk and Stock-Market Participation Costs”. Working Paper
[10] Hamilton, Barton H. 2000. “Does Entrepreneurship Pay ? An Empiri-
cal Analysis of the Returns to Self-Employment”, The Journal of Political
Economy, 108 (3): 604-631
[11] Heaton John and Lucas Deborah. 2000. “Portfolio Choice in The Presence
Of Background Risk”, Economic Journal. 110: 1-26.
[12] Heaton John and Lucas Deborah. 2000. “Portfolio Choice and Asset Prices:
The Importance of Entrepreneurial Risk”. The Journal of Finance. 55(3):
1163-1198
27[13] Heaton John and Lucas Deborah. 2002. “Capital Structure, Hurdle Rates,
and Porfolio Choice- Interactions in an Entrepreneurial Firm”, Working
Paper.
[14] Hintermaier Thomas and Steinberger Thomas. 2005. “Occupational Choice
and the Private Equity Premium Puzzle”. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control. 29: 1765-1783
[15] Hopenhayn Hugo A.. and Vereshchagina Galina. 2003. “Risk-Taking by
Entrepreneurs”. Working Paper.
[16] Hubbard Glenn; Skinner Jonathan and Zeldes Stephen. 1994. “The Im-
portance of Precautionary Motives in Explaining Individual and Aggregate
Saving”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series in Public Policy. 40: 59-
126.
[17] Hurst Erik and Lusardi Annamaria. 2002. “Liquidity Constraints, Wealth
Accumulation and Entrepreneurship”. Journal of Political Economy, 112
(2): 319-348.
[18] Jensen, Michael C. and Meckling William H. 1976. “Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Beahavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”. Journal
of Financial Economics3: 305-360.
[19] Jovanovic, Boyan. 1982. “Selection and The Evolution of Industry”. Econo-
metrica, 50: 649-70.
[20] Ljungqvist, Lars and Sargent Thomas J. 2000. Recursive Macroeconomic
Theory, Cambridge, Massachussets, MIT press.
[21] Moskowitz, Tobias and Vissing-Jørgensen Annette. 2002. “The Returns to
Entrepreneurial Investment: A Private Equity Premium Puzzle ?”. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 92(4): 745-778.
[22] Polkovnichenko Valery. “Human Capital and the Private Equity Premium”.
Review of Economic Dynamics, October 2003, 6 (4) pp. 831-845.
[23] Quadrini Vincenzo. 2000. “Entrepreneurship, saving and social mobility”,
Review of Economic Dynamics, 3,(1): 1-40.
[24] Rosen Harvey and Willen Paul. 2002. “Risk, Return and Self-Employment”.
Working Paper.
28